you wanted to immortalize the memory of his trade by taking a name derived from the running-up of furnaces (a calefaciundis furnis). As you insist however that the name of Calphurnius should be written with ph, with aspiration, as if it were Greek, I can see that in this respect as in all others you have not shown any reverence.
For when your father who desired to see you since he thought you to be the pier and staff of his old age, walked on foot from the mountains of Bergamo to Bologna where you taught, and began to search everywhere for anyone who could tell him where to look for Master Zanino (magistrum Zaninum) 4 (for it was the name you had been called with at your native land) he could find nobody who could tell him about it. But in the end he came across you by chance. And when he was about to shake your hand, embrace and kiss you in fatherly way you drove him off and were so rude that refused to recognize him as your father. And he could not get even a secret meeting with you, not by flattery or humble supplications, not by the intercession of a priest. Finally he lost all hope that he had previously set on you and went back home in great sorrow.
When neighbours asked him there what Master Zanino was doing he answered with a phrase coarse but witty:
"What he does, I do not know, but he is now called Scalfornius, not Zanino, for he has in fact scalforned me a good deal (et quidem me bene scalforniavit)", that is, "crossed up": for the inhabitants of the montains of Bergamo use the word scalfornie to signify lies and fraud.
In plain words, Reggio throws mud at Calphurnius and he does not disdain to use whatever means possible: endless mockery of his pseudonym, hints at his low birth, inreliable rumours on his enemy's immoral behaviour (one wonders where Reggio could have learned this story -are we to believe that he had travelled through villages around Bergamo in search of the father of Calphurnius?). Their quarrel had not been caused by a simple disagreement: in 1486 Calphurnius replaced Reggio at the chair of rhetoric in the University of Padua that the latter had occupied since 1482 with a salary of 200 florins, more than decent for a non-lawyer; to judge by the words of Reggio Calphurnius achieved it by shameless intrigues 5 (later Calphurnius occupied this position till his death in 1503, and Reggio took this post again in 1503-1509, but this time his salary was average -only 100 florins) 6 . Thus behind the outward appearance of scholarly debates one finds invectives fuelled by personal animosity topped up with the illustrations of the opponent's ignorance. This is a picture typical for scholarly quarrels of the Renaissance. Could one see any productive polemics, and are there any real scholarly debates here?
In Dans le jeu sérieux des questions et des réponses, dans le travail d'élucidation réciproque, les droits de chacun sont en quelque sorte immanents à la discussion. Ils ne relèvent que de la situation de dialogue. Celui qui questionne ne fait qu'user du droit qui lui est donné: n'être pas convaincu, percevoir une contradiction, avoir besoin d'une information supplémentaire, faire valoir des postulats différents, relever une faute de raisonnement. Quant à celui qui répond, il ne dispose non plus d'aucun droit excédentaire par rapport à la discussion elle-même; il est lié, par la logique de son propre discours, à ce qu'il a dit précédemment et, par l'acceptation du dialogue, à l'interrogation de l'autre. Questions et réponses relèvent d'un jeu -d'un jeu à la fois plaisant et difficile -où chacun des deux partenaires s'applique à n'user que des droits qui lui sont donnés par l'autre, et par la forme acceptée du dialogue.
Le polémiste, lui, s'avance bardé de privilèges qu'il détient d'avance et que jamais il n'accepte de remettre en question. Il possède, par principe, les droits qui l'autorisent à la guerre et qui font de cette lutte une entreprise juste; il n'a pas en face de lui un partenaire dans la recherche de la vérité, mais un adversaire, un ennemi qui a tort, qui est nuisible et dont l'existence même constitue une menace. Le jeu pour lui ne consiste donc pas à le reconnaître comme sujet ayant droit à la parole, mais à l'annuler comme interlocuteur de tout dialogue possible, et son objectif final ne sera pas d'approcher autant qu'il se peut d'une difficile vérité, mais de faire triompher la juste cause dont il est depuis le début le porteur manifeste.
Le polémiste prend appui sur une légitimité dont son adversaire, par définition, est exclu.
Il faudra peut-être un jour faire la longue histoire de la polémique comme figure parasitaire de la discussion et obstacle à la recherche de la vérité…
In the serious play of questions and answers, in the work of reciprocal elucidation, the rights of each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion. They depend only on the dialogue situation. The person asking the questions is merely exercising the right that has been given him: to remain unconvinced, to perceive a contradiction, to require more information, to emphasize different postulates, to point out faulty reasoning, and so on. As for the person answering the questions, he too exercises a right that does not go beyond the discussion itself; by the logic of his own discourse, he is tied to what he has said earlier, and by the acceptance of dialogue he is tied to the questioning of other. Questions and answers depend on a game-a game that is at once pleasant and difficult-in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of dialogue.
The polemicist , on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a just undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat. For him, then the game consists not of recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his final objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth but to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly upholding from the beginning.
The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that his adversary is by definition denied.
Perhaps, someday, a long history will have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on discussion and an obstacle to the search for the truth (tr. by L. Davis).
J. Crewe criticized this opinion of Foucault in his article in the collection Polemics edited by Jane Gallop; Crewe objects 8 :
Foucault's momentous gesture is one to which I shall return in due course, but before doing that I should additionally like to highlight one fairly staggering implication of Foucault's statement. It is that polemic has no constitutive role in intellectual history, or in bringing about intellectual change. Is legitimate intellectual history then also a history of non-violence? Can we just detach ourselves from the apparent fertility and even pleasure as well as the implicating troublesomeness of polemic?
If we are to compare three cited passages a mixed impression is formed: on the one hand,
Renaissance scholarly debates (to judge from this example) appear to illustrate the worst side of 'polemics' in the version by Foucault (there is certainly no dialogue here); on the other hand, there seems in fact to be no 'polemics' here at all (Reggio makes himself right, but he is right by definition, not as a proponent of a certain opinion; there is no "intangible point of dogma, the fundamental and necessary principle that the adversary has neglected, ignored or transgressed") 9 .
In the present article I will address the question: does one in fact find this sterile fiction of intellectual activity fuelled by nothing else but personal animosity of the participants in the Renaissance scholarly debates, or has perhaps the situation proved to be more complex?
In A doubt arises here (typical for the studies of the Renaissance reasoning of the accuracy of the work with texts). If the accuracy of references is the sign of a good textologist, and
Robortello is 'good', according to this parameter, and Sigonio is 'bad', how did it happen that Robortello has muddled the phrase by Muret shamelessly while Sigonio cited both his sources accurately? Could it be that it was all for show and Robortello slandered his personal enemy while his own approach to texts was no better? It often seems that debates on the Renaissance Thus Domitius: "although he had seen the best he chose the worst" <Ov. Met. 7.20-21>. And I would have loved to believe him, but rumors tell me that it is all lies. Here Domitius refers to a writer Dionysius <Periegetes>. If the word could be found anywhere in the latter's works, I would admit I had been wrong and even would rise my hand and would not object to be called the biggest windbag of all people.
But I will put aside all equivoques and will reveal the essence of the matter: these are not lines of Dionysius, they are not by him; these are the lines by Priscian, from the book where he translates the text of Dionysius from Greek <Priscian, Periegesis 174-175>. And Domitius has distorted and mutilated them:
the text by Priscian read ad Tethyos undas <"at the waves of Tethys">, and Domitius has deleted and reworked the old variant and wrote Attegias undas instead. I believe that he would not have done it had he taken metrics into consideration or counted lengths and moras of the syllables. For he put the word attegias so that, firstly, the third syllable from the end should be long, and this contradicts the testimony of the very same author he comments on, and secondly, the last syllable should be short, and this contradicts all authorities. Fortunately, the original text by Dionysius has survived; here are, I think the corresponding Greek lines <Dionysius Periegetes, Orbis descriptio 184-185>:
Ἀλλ' ἤτοι πυμάτην μὲν ἐπὶ γλωχῖνα νέμονται Ἀγχοῦ στυλάων Μαυρουσίδος ἔθνεα γαίης.
<"And by the further edge, next to the pillars, the peoples of the land of Mauritania live">.
And even if you read the whole text there -you will see that there is no hint of attegias in Dionysius, you will see that one writer is being cited under the name of the other, that the correct text has been taken out and a false one replaced it, that no attention is paid to metre and lengths of the syllables. Is there anybody still hesitating to disagree with this man at the first opportunity and to blow up this nonsense? And the fact that there had been a preconceived opinion of his learning and wit should make him even more hateful.
Here one does not deal with textual criticism but rather with an interpretation of the text but the parallel is revealing. Poliziano implies that Calderini has intentionally corrupted the text by Priscian so that it would support his interpretation of the text by Juvenal, and also has used an unclear reference, to create an impression that he does not quote Priscian but rather a Greek It is possible that the answer is the same both in case of Poliziano and in that of Robortello: when one criticizes one's opponents the careless citation "does not count".
Robortello says that one should quote manuscripts faithfully but he himself does not quote manuscripts but rather the work by a Muret who he wants to present in the worst possible light.
Poliziano says that one should quote ancient authors faithfully but Calderini is not one of them so he does not have to be treated with similar respect. In fact one deals with the rules of polemical rhetoric.
This detail clarifies an important point. It could have been noticed in my arguments that of the two problems touched upon at the beginning one remained in the shadows. Yes, it seems possible to talk about normal academic polemics in relation to the quarrels of the Renaissance scholars (at least, in some cases). Robortello and Poliziano were first of all unsatisfied by the contents of the scholarly work of their opponents, and it is not likely that they simply bear a grudge against opponents personally and so had to invent what to find fault with in their work.
At the same time both could hardly answer anything to Foucault's accusations against polemics as such. What they stood for was indeed a "fundamental and necessary principle that the adversary has neglected". The problematic nature of legitimacy of such polemics is obvious. Robortello made an impact on the fear of scholars to be accused of inaccurate and unfaithful work with manuscript that was growing with the progress of the century, but it could hardly help scholars to understand the text of Horace under discussion. The details are being pushed into the background, and polemical effect dominates the text. All advantages and disadvantages of this situations were often typical for the Renaissance scholarly debates, and it is up to us to decide whether we would concentrate on the former, or on the latter.
